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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*

In a year defined by global realignment, juristic unions that were are no
more. As flags fell from legal fortresses previously deemed impregnable,
precepts formerly unthinkable coalesced into startling staples of litigational'performance. In sharp contrast to this panorama of pandemonium,
the banner of local government law never dipped; indeed, its proud and
uninterrupted summitry gave classic illustration to the diplomatic art of
staying the course. Its judicial decisions marked the domains of boundary
conundrums, and its statutes sought settlement of analytical quandaries.
In cold war's wake, law's universe hailed one clear winner: the law of local
government.
I.

A.

MUNICIPALITIES

Officers and Employees

Municipal officers and employees attain their positions via the
processes of appointment and election. Each of those processes attracted
litigation during the survey period.
Focusing upon appointment, Columbus, Georgia v. Board of Water
Commissioners' featured a quo warranto challenge against appointment
of a council member to the municipal water board.2 A unanimous supreme court invalidated the appointment, wielding a general statute that
prohibited council members from holding other municipal offices.8 The
* Talmadge Professor of Law, University of Georgia. University of Georgia (A.B., 1956;
LL.B., 1958); Harvard University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Deep appreciation is expressed to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government of the University of Georgia for summer research support that contributed most significantly to the preparation of this survey.
1. 261 Ga. 219, 403 S.E.2d 791 (1991).
2. Id. at 219, 403 S.E.2d at 792. For treatment of this popular action in the local government context, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO IN GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW (1987).
3. 261 Ga. at 220, 403 S.E.2d at 792. See O.C.G.A. § 36-30-4 (1987).
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court expressly rejected reliance upon a charter amendment authorizing
the council to "'redefine the manner'" of water board appointments.'
The power to redefine, the court held, could not bear construction as
"specifically authorizing the council to appoint its members to the
board." In the absence of the requisite express authority, therefore, the
court approved issuance of the writ of quo warranto. s
The court was also unanimous in Mayor & Council of Wadley v. Hall,7
in turning back a proceeding to contest the election of a municipal council member.8 The contestants had failed (by one day) to file their petition
within five days following declaration of the election results., That failure, the court asserted, precluded the trial judge's jurisdiction of the contest."0 Moreover, the contestants' failure to utilize adequate legal remedies, the court held, rendered erroneous the trial judge's employment of
equity to invalidate the election.11
Over time, the local government official has played a pivotal role in
evolving the modern law of defamation. 12 Illustrative of context, Eidson v.
Berry's encompassed a city attorney's libel action for published statements concerning his official conduct.1 4 Appraising defendant's charges
that plaintiff had delivered recordings to a newspaper and had violated
4. 261 Ga. at 220, 403 S.E.2d at 792.
5. Id. This was true, the court emphasized, even "[p]assing over the question of
whether a charter provision that specifically authorizes self-appointment would be valid if it
were contrary to the general law codified in O.C.G.A. § 36-30-4." 261 Ga. at 220, 403 S.E.2d
at' 792.
6. Id. The court also rejected the consolidated government's argument that if it were
treated as a county, the appointment would be valid. Id. at 221, 403 S.E.2d at 792. "The
council clearly serves a supervisory and/or appellate function in relation to the board which
would be inconsistent to board membership." Id.
7. 261 Ga. 681, 410 S.E.2d 105 (1991).
8. Id. at 682, 410 S.E.2d at 106.
9. Id. at 681, 410 S.E.2d at 105. See O.C.G.A. § 21-3-420 (1987).
10. 261 Ga. at 681, 410 S.E.2d at 105-06. The court held the record insufficient to sustain
contestants' contention that defendants' fraud had tolled the five-day limit. Id., 410 S.E.2d
at 106.
11. Id. at 682, 410 S.E.2d at 106. Justice Bell employed a concurring opinion "to make
clear to prospective contest petitioners exactly how strictly this Court is applying the fiveday period of O.C.G.A. § 21-3-420." 261 Ga. at 682, 410 S.E.2d at 106. He noted that contestants' delay in filing the petition was the result of defendants' delay in supplying a document identifying electors who voted in the election. Id. at 683-84, 410 S.E.2d at 107. "The
result of the Court's holding is that the election at issue in this case will be allowed to stand,
despite having been tainted by undisputed, serious, and pervasive irregularities." Id. at 685,
410 S.E.2d at 108.
12. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Defamation in Georgia Local Government Law: A Brief
History, 16 GA. L. REV. 627 (1982).
13. 202 Ga. App. 587, 415 S.E.2d 16 (1992).
14. Id. at 587, 415 S.E.2d at 16-17. Defendant's statements were published in a letter to
the editor of a local newspaper. Id., 415 S.E.2d at 17.
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federal law, the trial judge deemed those charges unactionable as constituting mere opinions.1 5 Reversing, the court of appeals directed inquiry to
whether the "statements can reasonably be interpreted as stating or implying defamatory facts about plaintiff and, if so, whether the defamatory
assertions are capable of being proved false."" Answering both questions
in the affirmative,' 7 the court then confronted plaintiff's status as a "public figure"18 by emphasizing defendant's testimony that he only assumed
the truth of his charges.'0 "This evidence alone is sufficient," the court
concluded, "to authorize any reasonable jury's finding that defendant...
acted with'0 reckless disregard . . . in accusing [plaintiff] of violating fed2
eral law."

B.. Openness
The call for public disclosure of public business rings insistently and
incessantly in local government law.21 The General Assembly has answered the call for both open records and open meetings by providing
procedures for exposure.2 On at least two recent occasions, the procedures provided by the Open Records Act brought municipalities to
litigation."
In Dortch v. Atlanta Journal & Atlanta Constitution,2 4 the supreme
court held the Act to require disclosure of all municipal cellular telephone
bills, including numbers called from those phones and the numbers of the
phones themselves.2 The court rejected a personal privacy contention regarding calls to unlisted numbers.2 6 Disclosure, the court maintained, had
not been shown "so offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man as to
15. Id.
16, Id. at 588, 415 S.E.2d at 17. The court observed that some expressions of opinion are
capable of implying an assertion of fact. Id. at 587, 415 S.E.2d at 17.
17. Id. at 588, 415 S.E.2d at 17. The court reasoned that "the accusation that plaintiff is
guilty of a crime punishable by law is susceptible of being proved false." Id.
18. Id. Thus, the necessity of proving "actual malice" on the part of the defendant. Id.
19. Id. at 588-89, 415 S.E.2d at 18. Defendant testified that he only assumed plaintiff
delivered the tapes, and that he assumed that a federal law prohibited such tape recorded
private conversations. Id.
20. Id. at 589, 415 S.E.2d at 18.
21. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local Government
Law, 13 GA. L. REv. 97 (1978).
22. See O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -74 (1990).
23. See Dortch v. Atlanta Journal & Atlanta Constitution, 261 Ga. 350, 405 S.E.2d 43
(1991); McBride v. Wetherington, 199 Ga. App. 7, 403 S.E.2d 873 (1991).
24. 261 Ga. 350, 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991).
25. Id. at 352, 405 S.E.2d at 45.
26. Id. at 351-52, 405 S.E.2d at 44-45.
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Acknowledging that exposure

of cellular phone numbers might increase municipal telephone expenses,
the court nevertheless insisted
that "there is presently no exemption for
28
such records under the act.
The court of appeals broached the disclosure issue in McBride v.
Wetherington.29 A prison inmate sought compensatory and punitive dam-

ages from a municipal police chief, charging the chiefs failure to provide
plaintiff's investigatory records."0 Reviewing the evidence, the court

traced the chief's original refusal to disclose, based upon the Act's exemption for records of an ongoing investigation. 1 Subsequently, however, the
chief had relinquished, agreeing to provide the records upon plaintiff's
payment of the copying fee.32 The evidence failed to indicate that the
chief's actions were inappropriate, the court concluded, and the Act authorized recovery of neither compensatory nor punitive damages.3 3
C.

Regulation

Municipal regulatory power enjoys a rich and controversial history in
Georgia local government law.3 4 No facet of that history looms larger than
27. Id. at 352, 405 S.E.2d at 45. The court emphasized also that the municipality had
made no showing that any of the numbers in issue were in fact unlisted numbers. Id.
28. Id. The court said that "[a]ny such remedy must come from the General Assembly."
Id. Justices Smith and Benham wrote dissenting opinions. Id. Justice Smith was concerned
that "[t]he real result of today's opinion is that any member of the general public, including
convicted felons, may access the personal unlisted telephone numbers of our citizens, including police officers and their families . . . . [This] effectively denies these officers, and
others, their right to privacy and frustrates their attempts to shield their families and homes
from intrusion." Id. at 354, 405 S.E.2d at 46-47. Justice Benham disagreed with the court's
refusal to hear an issue simply because the municipality did not raise in the court below the
issue of whether some of the numbers may be exempt from disclosure under O.C.G.A. § 5018-72(a)(3). 261 Ga. at 355-56, 405 S.E.2d at 47.
29. 199 Ga. App. 7, 403 S.E.2d 873 (1991).
30. Id. at 7, 403 S.E.2d at 874.
31. Id. at 7-8, 403 S.E.2d at 875. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) expressly exempts from disclosure records of law enforcement agencies in any pending investigation. O.C.G.A. § 50-1872(a)(4) (1990).
32. 199 Ga. App. at 8, 403 S.E.2d at 875. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71(c) expressly provides for a
copying fee of 25 cents per page. The statute does not provide for excusal of payment when
a pauper's affidavit is filed. 199 Ga. App. at 8, 403 S.E.2d at 875.
33. 199 Ga. App. at 8, 403 S.E.2d at 875. "In any event, OCGA § 50-18-73(b) only authorizes an award of attorney fees and expenses of litigation in actions brought to enforce the
statute if the court determines that the action constituting a violation of the statute was
completely without merit as to law or fact." Id.
34. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8
GA. L. Rav. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in
Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. Rav. 115 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. Rav.'1039 (1981).
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the subject of this year's contribution to the mosaic. The facts in City of
LaGrange v. Troup County Electric Membership Corp.3s unfolded a municipality's effort to collect a fee from a "secondary supplier" of electricity within the corporate limits.3 ' Brandishing a 1975 ordinance purporting
to impose the fee,3 7 the municipality claimed amounts allegedly due for a
period of some eight years.38 The court of appeals approached the controversy via the avenues of both "franchise" and "license"; the court con39
cluded that neither avenue provided support for the exaction.
The court characterized a franchise as a contract; a franchise fee, in
turn, required both a contractual relationship and a statutory grant of
authority."" Although both the municipal charter and the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act' authorized a franchise fee for the use of municipal streets, authority alone "does not mean that there is a franchise
agreement.""' Because the municipality conceded the absence of an express agreement, the court inquired whether the parties had created an
implied franchise contract.'3 Two points preponderated in the negative:
the supplier gave the municipality no reason to anticipate compensation,"" and the municipality made no effort to enjoin use of its streets
while resolving the dispute. 45 The municipality could not unilaterally create an implied franchise agreement, the court declared, simply by adopting a fee ordinance.'
35. 200 Ga. App. 418, 408 S.E.2d 708 (1991).
36. The municipality itself was the "primary supplier" of electricity. Id. at 418, 408
S.E.2d at 709.
37. The ordinance classified businesses and imposed a fee upon "electric services" equal
to four percent of gross sales. Id.
38. The municipality adopted the ordinance in 1975 and demanded payment from defendant in 1976. Defendait refused to pay, and the municipality here claimed fees allegedly
due for 1979 through 1987. Id. at 419, 408 S.E.2d at 710.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 419-20, 408 S.E.2d at 710. The court said that "the terms 'franchise' and 'license' are not synonymous" and that "in order for a city to collect a franchise fee there
must be a contractual relationship between the city and the party from whom the fee is
sought .,. . ." Id.
41. O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-1 to -541 (1992).
42. 200 Ga. App. at 420, 408 S.E.2d at 711.
43. Id. "The City does not contend that it has an express agreement with Troup EMC,
but only that there is an implied franchise agreement between the City and Troup EMC
resulting from Troup EMC's acceptance of the privilege of using the City's streets after the
enactment of the ordinance." Id.
44. Id. at 421, 408 S.E.2d at 711. "Troup EMC at all pertinent times disputed the City's
right to collect such a fee from it." Id.
45. Id. Short of that effort, the court said, defendant supplier could reasonably have
assumed that plaintiff acquiesced in defendant's continued use of the streets and did not
expect payment. Id.
46. Id. at 422, 408 S.E.2d at 712.
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The court then turned to the municipality's alternative justification for
the fee: the authority to license.47 Stressing the necessity for a "plain and
unmistakable" grant of power, the court located the controlling charter
provision.' s That provision, however, confined municipal licensing authority to businesses "'pursued for the purpose of personal gain or
profit.'

"4'

The "nonprofit characteristics" of the electric membership cor-

poration, the court held, fell beyond the reach of the authorization, and
the municipality was doomed to an adverse summary judgment.50
D. Contracts
Possessed of unique defenses to contractual responsibility, 1 a municipality may also employ tort law's assistance in seeking secondary liability.
It was the trial court's denial of that assistance that brought Mayor of
Savannah v. Southern Bulk Industries, Inc.52 to the court of appeals.
Having been sued in contract for interruption of a customer's water
supply, the municipality filed a third-party complaint, in tort, against defendant. Defendant had actually caused the interruption, the municipality maintained, by damaging a pipeline.58 Reversing the dismissal, the
court refused to view the municipal "complaint as an attempt. . . to enforce the right of contribution from a joint tortfeasor."O4 . Rather, the complaint branded defendant a tortfeasor "only as to the City," ' and in that
capacity "secondarily liable for any contractual damages that the City
may ultimately be obligated to pay [its customer]." ' Whether or not de47. Id.
48. Id. at 423, 408 S.E.2d at 712. "The trial court closely and correctly examined the
authorizing charter provisions to determine if the City's right to collect the fee in question is
conferred on the City in 'plain and unmistakable terms.'" Id.
49. Id. (quoting LAGRANGE, GA., CHARTER § 5.20 (1968)).
50. Id. at 424, 408 S.E.2d at 713. "The trial court also properly found that the nonprofit
characteristics of Troup EMC exempted it from the licensing power of the City pursuant to
Section 5.20 of the City Charter." Id.
51. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and Contracts That Bind, 3
GA. L. REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law: Configurations of Codification, 24 GA. L. REV. 95 (1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Binding Contracts in County Government-Never Mind, GA. CouNTY Gov., Mar. 1991, at
28.
52. 198 Ga. App. 867, 403 S.E.2d 447 (1991).
53. Id. at 867, 403 S.E.2d at 448. The court noted that the customer's claim "against the
City is for damages allegedly caused by a breach of the City's contract to supply water. The
City's third-party complaint, on the other hand, alleges that [defendant] . . .precipitated
any breach of contract by negligently damaging the City's pipeline." Id.
54. Id. at 868, 403 S.E.2d at 488. "There are no allegations by the City that [defendant]
is a joint tortfeasor." Id.; 403 S.E.2d at 448-49.
55. Id., 403 S.E.2d at 449.
56. Id.
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fendant possessed tort defenses to the claim, the municipality could not
be denied "the right to seek to enforce that claim through resort to the
third-party procedure.""7

E. Finances
The supreme court rendered at least three noteworthy decisions concerning municipal finance. 5' The decision in Collins v. City of Dalton5 '
focused upon local government's dynamic duo of revenue bonds and ad
valorem taxation. Essentially, Collins subjected the former to the latter.
Thus, the court held that the Constitution *of 198360 subjected to ad
valorem taxation gas or electric generating systems financed by a municipality (via revenue bonds) and located outside the county.' "The purpose
.. .was to treat, on the same basis as private utilities, those municipal

utilities that finance generating or distribution facilities through bonded
indebtedness-as to such facilities that are located outside their home
counties."" Employing a construction that frowns upon tax exemptions,63
the court applied its decision
even to municipal bonds issued prior to the
4
constitution's ratification.
Macon-Bibb County Board of Tax Assessors v. Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc."' featured another familiar exemption quandary of ad valorem
taxation." In that case, an airline denied tax liability upon the interest in
an airport maintenance facility that it had acquired under a thirty-year
sublease from a municipal-county industrial authority.' 7 Acknowledging
57. Id.
58. See Collins v. City of Dalton, 261-Ga. 584, 408 S.E.2d 106 (1991); Macon-Bibb
County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Atlantic S.E. Airlines, Inc., 262 Ga. 119, 414 S.E.2d 635
(1992); City of Roswell v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 657, 410 S.E.2d 28 (1991).
59. 261 Ga. 584, 408 S.E.2d 106 (1991).
60. GA. CONsT. art. IX, § 6, para. 2 (1983).
61. 261 Ga. at 585, 408 S.E.2d at 107. The municipality had issued the bonds in 1977,
and the Revenue Commissioner first issued notices of ad valorem taxes on the facilities in
1984. Id. at 584, 408 S.E.2d at 107.
62. Id. at 586, 408 S.E.2d at 108. "[This] is a rational attempt to create some parity
between competitors, one set of which enjoys an exemption from ad valorem taxation." Id.
63. "The policy of the law always has looked with disfavor upon tax exemptions." Id.
64. Id., 408 S.E.2d at 109. The court reasoned that "the state may not grant tax exemptions, whether statutory or constitutional, that cannot be revoked." Id.
65. 262 Ga. 119, 414 S.E.2d 635 (1992).
66. For treatment of that quandary, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Caesar Confronts Caesar:
Local Government Property Taxation and Local Government Property, 31 MERCER L. REv.
293 (1979).
67. The municipality had leased land to the municipal-county industrial authority which
then entered into a thirty-year sublease with the airline for an airport maintenance facility.
Construction of the facility was completed in 1989, and the municipal-county tax assessors
levied taxes upon the airline for 1990. 262 Ga. at 119, 414 S.E.2d at 635-36.
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the analytical tension between a taxable "estate for years" e and a nontaxable "usufruct," s the court scrutinized the provisions of the sublease. 70 Those provisions included restrictions upon subletting, erecting
signs, and uses of the premises, as well as the authority's power to retake
portions of the premises.7 1 Such restrictions characterized the airline's inthe
terest as a mere usufruct, the court held 72 and "successfully 7rebutted
8
presumption that the 30-year lease was an estate for years. 1
The other staple of municipal finance, the sales tax, claimed the court's
attention in City of Roswell v. City of Atlanta.7 4 Specifically, the court
formulated the issue to be "the effective date for a new distribution
formula for the local option sales tax when a minority municipality requests treatment as an absent municipality. 7 5 That date, the court concluded, whether the new formula resulted from a negotiated certificate or
from an order of the revenue commissioner, was January 1 of the next
7e
calendar year.
F. Liability
The litigational tide of municipal liability virtually overflowed its analytical banks this year.7 7 The issues ranged the gamut, beginning with the
tort "basics" of McPherson v. City of Fort Oglethorpe.78 That action was
for the death of a pedestrian struck at the intersection of a city street and
68. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-103 (1991). The court conceded that "there is a rebuttable presumption that a lease for five years or more is a taxable estate for years." 262 Ga. at 119, 414
S.E.2d at 636.
69. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-1 (1991).
70. 262 Ga. at 119-20, 414 S.E.2d at 636.
71. Id. at 120, 414 S.E.2d at 636.
72. Id. at 121, 414 S.E.2d at 637. "That among these restrictions are some that may be
reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances does not make them compatible with
an estate for years as defined by Georgia law." Id. at 121, 414 S.E.2d at 637.
73. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision that the airline's interest in the
premises was not subject to ad valorem taxation. Id. Justice Fletcher dissented, and Chief
Justice Clarke did not participate. Id. at 122, 414 S.E.2d at 637.
74. 261 Ga. 657, 410 S.E.2d 28 (1991).
75. Id. at 657, 410 S.E.2d at 28. The county had passed a local option sales tax in 1982,
and plaintiff municipality sought a renegotiation of distribution following its increased population in the 1990 decennial census. Renegotiation among the political subdivisions failed,
and the State Revenue Commissioner instituted a new distribution formula under O.C.G.A.
§ 48-8-89. 261 Ga. at 657, 410 S.E.2d at 29. See O.C.G.A. § 48-8-89 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
76. 261 Ga. at 658, 410 S.E.2d at 29. The court reasoned that "[r]eallocating tax procedures at the beginning of the calendar, and often fiscal, year honors the legislature's intent
to encourage negotiation and assist local governments in planning their budgets." Id.
77.- See generally R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN
GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort Liability: The
"Crisis" Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. Rav. 19 (1986).
78. 200 Ga. App. 129, 407 S.E.2d 99 (1991).
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a state highway. Charging that the traffic signal operated on a defective
timing sequence, plaintiff relied upon various commitments contained in
the municipality's permit application for the signal.7e Discounting those
application statements," and hoisting a general statute on state highways
lying within municipal limits,"1 the court of appeals was adamant: "Because plaintiffs did not establish any duty of the City to maintain the
traffic signal, an essential element of negligence is missing ...
and there
2
can be no liability on the part of the City."
3
A second negligence action of the period, Haire v. City of Macon,1
sought damages for injuries incurred when plaintiff slipped on a ramp
while attending a hog show at a municipal barn.84 Balancing expert testimony of the ramp's obviously defective condition"5 against undisputed evidence of no prior -accidents,"" the court reversed summary judgment for
the municipality." "[A] question of fact exists here whether the ramp was
a defective condition which appellee, in the exercise of ordinary care in
keeping its premises safe in the more than 30 years it had owned the
premises, knew or should have known would cause injury to an invitee." s
The period witnessed a number of efforts by claimants to pursue the
"nuisance" route to municipal responsibility.89 Three decisions by the
79. Id. at 130, 407 S.E.2d at 100. This was the municipality's application for the signal to
the State Department of Transportation; the DOT subsequently issued the permit. Id.
80. Id., 407 S.E.2d at 101. "The application for a permit is merely the means by which
the City agreed to install and operate the traffic signal in accordance with DOT's regulations." Id.
81. See O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(b) (1991). This statute, in the absence of municipal agreement otherwise, expressly relieves municipalities from liability for such highways. Id.
82. 200 Ga. App. at 131, 407 S.E.2d at 101. "[T]here is uncontroverted evidence that
DOT had complete control and authority regarding the timing and sequence of the traffic
signal, and plaintiffs failed to show any agreement by the City to maintain the traffic signal." Id. The court thus affirmed summary judgment for the municipality. Id.
83. 200 Ga. App. 744, 409 S.E.2d 670 (1991).
84.: Id. at 744, 409 S.E.2d at 670.
85. "In his opinion the ramp was so bad that he could easily see it as a cause of an
accident and was 'very surprised' when told there had been no other accidents." Id. at 745,
409 S.E.2d at 671.
86. "It- is uncontroverted that prior to appellant's accident, the City had received no
notification that anyone had fallen or been injured in any way while using the ramp." Id.
87. Id. at ,744, 409 S.E.2d at 670.
88. Id. at 747, 409 S.E.2d at 672. Judge Andrews, joined by Presiding Judge Birdsong,
dissented on grounds that plaintiff had failed to show his own ordinary care in respect to
the patent defect. Id. at 748, 409 S.E.2d at 672 (Andrews, J., dissenting). Judge Beasley also
dissented. 200 Ga. App. at 747, 409 S.E.2d at 672.
89. For treatment of "nuisance" liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL,

JR., THE LAW oF MUNIcIPAL TORT LIABILITY

IN GEORGIA

117.34 (4th ed. 1988); R.

Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Liability in Georgia: The "Nuisance" Nuisance, 12 GA. ST.
B.J. 11 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER
L. RE v. 1 (1991).
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court of appeals aptly illustrated the search inherent in that pursuit for
1 encomthe requisite municipal "knowledge." 90 Grier v. City of Atlanta"
passed an action for injuries to a child who jumped from a train that he
had boarded as it passed through a municipal park.92 Reversing summary
judgment for the municipality, the court emphasized railroad employee
testimony that children played on or around trains in the park on many
occasions." Additionally, a municipal agent acknowledged the frequent
presence of maintenance crews at the park.'4 The court reasoned as follows: "Although there was no evidence of actual knowledge, we find that
the evidence presented by appellant was sufficient to raise a question of
fact as to whether the City had constructive notice of the dangerous
condition." 95
The court responded in similar fashion in Carter v. Mayor & Aldermen
of Savannah,96 an action for injuries sustained in an intersection collision
allegedly caused by a missing stop sign."7 The court canvassed evidence of
reoccurring vandalizing of signs, this particular sign's replacement some
four months earlier, and its absence for at least one week prior to the
collision." Emphasizing that municipal employees were required to report
missing signs, as well as the continuous presence of municipal agents in
the area during the week in question," the court announced the following
conclusion: "[W]e cannot say, as a matter of law, that one week was too
short a period of time for the City to have learned about the missing stop
sign and to have initiated action to remedy the dangerous situation." 100
Yet another intersection collision case, Denson v. City of Atlanta,10 1
instanced the opposite conclusion. Denson featured a complaint that the

90. See Grier v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. App. 575, 408 S.E.2d 794 (1991); Carter v.
Mayor & Alderman of Savannah, 200 Ga. App. 263, 407 S.E.2d 421 (1991); Denson v. City of
Atlanta, 202 Ga. App. 325, 414 S.E.2d 312 (1991).
91. 200 Ga. App. 575, 408 S.E.2d 794 (1991).
92. The railroad track had intersected the park since its creation in 1910, and trains ran
through the park at least daily. Id. at 575, 408 S.E.2d at'795.
93. Id. at 576, 408 S.E.2d at 796.
94. Id.
95. Id. "Furthermore, the evidence shows that occurrences involving children playing
on or near the trains were regularly repeated. Thus, the City can be chargeable with 'creating a continuous or regularly repetitious condition.'" Id.
96. 200 Ga. App. 263, 407 S.E.2d 421 (1991).
97. Id. at 263, 407 S.E.2d at 422.
98. Id. at 265, 407 S.E.2d at 423. The sign problem was exacerbated by the loose, sandy
condition of the soil in the municipality. Id.
99. These included police officers on routine patrol and a street sweeper. Id. at 266, 407
S.E.2d at 424.
100. Id. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial judge's summary judgment in favor of
the municipality. Id.
101. 202 Ga. App. 325, 414 S.E.2d 312 (1991).
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"conflicts monitor" on a traffic light had "malfunctioned," causing the
light to shift from the normal "stop and go" pattern to a "flashing
mode.' 0 2 Affirming the trial judge's decision for the municipality, 03 the
court explained that "[ujnder the circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of a single prior accident at the intersection during the previous
night was insufficient as a matter of law to place the city on notice that a
nuisance existed."'
An unsuccessful reach for the "civil rights" alternative to municipal
0 an action for the death
tort liability 05 unfolded in Green v. Moreland,"'
of a contractor's employee while working on a bridge replacement inside
municipal limits. 0 7 Focusing upon failure "to enact any safety methods
or procedures for construction projects,"' plaintiff charged local government violation of due process under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act. 10 In appraising the claim, the court expressed conceptual difficulty
in fitting facts to theory: "'[The] purpose [of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment] was to protect the people from the State,
not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.' ",o Given
"the state's enactment of safeguards against contact with high-voltage
lines,""' the court could find no municipal or county default so obvious
12
as to rise to the necessary level of deliberate indifference to the need.

102. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the intersection was dangerous when the signals were
flashing. Id. at 327, 414 S.E.2d at 314.
103. That is, the trial court had granted the municipality's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 326, 414 S.E.2d at 314.
104. Id. at 328, 414 S.E.2d at 315. The court observed:
[i]n a sense the lights were not malfunctioning, in that they were not giving conflicting or inappropriate signals but were operating in the intended back-up mode.
Thus, this was not a situation in which any reasonable person would necessarily
have realized by mere observation that a dangerous condition existed.
Id.
105. For treatment of this alternative, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GovERNMENT LAW's ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984).
106. 200 Ga. App. 167, 407 S.E,2d 119 (1991).
107. The county had contracted with plaintiff's employer to replace the bridge located
inside the municipality, and plaintiff was killed when a crane came in contact with overhead
high-voltage wires. Id. at 167, 407 S.E.2d at 120.
108. Id. at 169, 407 S.E.2d at 122.
109. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1992).
110. 200 Ga. App. at 169-70, 407 S.E.2d at 122 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989)).
111. Id. at 170, 407 S.E.2d at 122. The court cited O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-30 to -40.
112. 200 Ga. App. at 170, 407 S.E.2d at 122. The court cited City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989), to require "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . from
among various alternatives by city [or county] policymakers." Id. The court affirmed the
trial judge's summary judgment for the municipality and county. Id., 407 S.E.2d at 123.
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The official immunity of the municipal officer or employee drew the
court of appeals attention on three interesting occasions." ' In each, the
court purported to follow the supreme court's 1990 approach in Logue v.
Wright:"" For "mere negligence" (as opposed to malice, corruption, 'or
wilfulness) in his "official capacity" (as opposed to personal or individual
capacity), the officer enjoys sovereign immunity for "discretionary" acts
(as opposed to ministerial acts), unless the government has waived that
immunity." Moreover, the court in Logue proceeded to classify as a "discretionary act" the officer's decision to rush to the scene of an, emergency."" This year the court of appeals reached similar conclusions in
Adams v. Perdue"' 7 (immunity for police officer who damaged plaintiff's
car while investigating a fight);"' in Sinkfield v. Pike" (immunity for
fire fighter who injured plaintiffs while responding to a fire alarm);' 20 and
in Banks v.Patton'' (immunity for police officer who injured plaintiff
while responding to an emergency).' 22 In each case, even conceding the
negligence of the municipal officials, the court affirmed summary judgments in favor of the officials.'2 "
As for immunity of the municipality itself, specifically the issue of immunity waiver, the survey period encompassed important developments.
Background necessary for fully appreciating those developments consists
of two earlier supreme court decisions. " First, in 1985, in Toombs
113. See Adams v. Perdue; 199 Ga. App. 476, 405 S.E.2d 305 (1991); Sinkfield v. Pike,
201 Ga. App. 652, 411 S.E.2d 889 (1991); Banks v. Patton, 202 Ga. App..168, 413 S.E.2d 744
(1991). For background on official immunity, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Offi'cials: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA, L. REv. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Individual Liability in GeorgiaLocal Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy,
40 MERCER L. REv. 303 (1988).
114. 260 Ga. 206, 392 S.E.2d 235 (1990).
115. Id. at 207, 392 S.E.2d at 236. See also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law,
43 MERCER L. REV. 317, 344-46 (1991).
116. 260 Ga. at 208, 392 S.E.2d at 237.
117. 199 Ga. App. 476, 405 S.E.2d 305 (1991).
118. The officer backed his car into plaintiff's car while attempting to get to the scene of
the altercation. Id. at 477, 405 S.E.2d'at 306.
119. 201 Ga. App. 652, 411 S.E.2d 889 (1991).
120. The officer struck plaintiff while proceeding through an intersection. Id. at 652, 411
S.E.2d at 889.
121. 202 Ga. App. 168, 413 S.E.2d 744 (1991).
122. The court held that failure to use the siren constituted only negligence and .not
wilful or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Id. at 170, 413 S.E,2d at.746. Judge
Beasley dissented, urging, the issue to be one for the jury. Id. at 171, 413 S.E.2d at 746-47
(Beasley, J., dissenting).
123. See supra notes 100, 102, 104 and accompanying text.
124. For treatment of that background, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 184 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis" Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 19 (1986).
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County v. O'Neal,'" the court held counties to be among the state's "departments and agencies", that, under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX,
of the Constitution of 1983, waived sovereign immunity by obtaining liability insurance.126 Second, in 1990, in Logue v. Wright,27 the court held
that a county's unauthorized self-insurance plan for compensating claims
against its employees was not the liability insurance necessary to trigger
immunity waiver.128 Those decisions raised two further issues: Were municipalities, like counties, included within the Article I provision on
waiver; if so, what kind of "insurance" would trigger the waiver?
In the survey period case of Adams v. Perdue,'29 the court of appeals
appeared to assume that the presence of liability insurance would waive
municipal immunity.3M The court then turned to the municipality's participation in the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency
("GIRMA").' 3 Under that statutory plan, member municipalities pool
their risks and jointly purchase liability coverage.' 32 The GIRMA statute
expressly declares, however, that participation "shall not constitute the
obtaining of liability insurance and no sovereign immunity shall be
waived on account of such participation.' " s Accordingly, the court in Adams held "the City's participation in GIRMA [did] not waive sovereign
immunity, by the express terms of the statutes."'3 4
125. 254 Ga. 390, 330 S.E.2d 95 (1985).
126. Id.at 391, 330 S.E.2d at 97.
127. 260 Ga. 206, 392 S.E.2d 235 (1990).
128. Id. at 209, 392 S.E.2d at 238.
129. 199 Ga. App. 476, 405 S.E.2d 305 (1991). Plaintiff sued both the municipality and
its police officer for damages to his car, which was struck by the officer as he went to the
scene of an altercation. Id. at 477, 405 S.E.2d at 306.
130. Id. at 478, 405 S.E.2d at 306.
131. Id. at 477, 405 S.E.2d at 306. See O.C.G.A. § 36-85-1 to -20 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
132. O.C.G.A. § 36-85-2 (1987).
133. Id. § 36-85-20.
134. 199 Ga. App. at 477, 405 S.E.2d at 306. The court of appeals followed this decision
later in the survey period in the case of Sinkfield v. Pike, 201 Ga. App. 652, 411 S.E.2d 889
(1991).
In the period case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 202 Ga. App. 692, 415 S.E.2d 308
(1992), the court passed upon the effect of an indemnification agreement. Id. at 692, 415
S.E.2d at 308. There, claimant was injured by a municipal truck and received payment from
his insurer. The municipality then paid to the insurer as subrogation the limit of its selfinsurance and received from the insurer an indemnification agreement. Later, the claimant
sued municipality in negligence and nuisance, and municipality cross-claimed against insurer, arguing that the indemnification agreement completely discharged the municipality.
Id. at 692-93, 415 S.E.2d at 309. The court held that absent clear and specific language to do
so, the agreement did not indemnify the municipality for its own negligence. Id. at 694, 415
S.E.2d at 310.
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Later in the period, the same two issues confronted the supreme
court.1"s Hiers v. City of Barwick" featured an action against a municipality and its police chief for plaintiff's injuries incurred when struck by a
speeding car being pursued by the chief. Asserting immunity, defendants
contended that the constitution's Article I "waiver" provision did not apply to municipalities. " ' Alternatively, defendants maintained, municipal
participation in GIRMA did not constitute "insurance" within the meaning of the waiver provision.13 8 Of the supreme court's response to those
defenses, one observation can be safely tendered: utter, and unsettling,
dissention prevailed.
A bare majority, of the court, consisting of three justices and one superior court judge,189 held first that the Article I provision did apply to municipalities.140 Like counties, municipalities too were among the state's
"departments and agencies" that waived their immunity by obtaining liability insurance."" "[T]he reasoning of the Toombs case," the court asserted, "applies with equal force to municipalities.'4 Second, the court
turned to the effect of municipal participation in GIRMA." s Although
conceding the GIRMA statute clearly to reserve the municipality's immunity, the court viewed that reservation to run counter to Article 1:144
"[W]e hold that OCGA § 36-85-20 conflicts with the Constitution of
Georgia and is therefore void. '"45 Expressly disapproving the court of ap135. See Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).
136. 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).
137. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
138. 262 Ga. at 130, 414 S.E.2d at 648. O.C.G.A. § 36-85-20 (1987).
139. Chief Justice Clarke wrote the niajority opinion. Presiding Justice Weltner disqualified, and the superior court judge sat in his place. 262 Ga. at 132, 414 S.E.2d at 649.
140. Id. at 131, 414 S.E.2d at 648. Preliminarily, the court indicated that under its decision in Donaldson v. DOT, 262 Ga. 49, 414 S.E.2d 638 (1992), discussed infra note 299 and
accompanying text, the 1991 amendment to Article I will control in cases filed against municipalities after January 1, 1991, Hiers, 262 Ga. at 130, 414 S.E.2d at 648. The action in
Hiers accrued before, and was filed before, that date, and the 1983 version of Article I thus
applied. Id. (After the survey period had closed, the supreme court decided Curtis v. Board
of Regents, 262 Ga. 226, 416 S.E.2d 510 (1992), holding that the 1991 amendment did not
apply to actions accruing before, but filed after, January 1, 1991. Id. at 262, 416 S.E.2d at
511.)

141. 262 Ga. at 130, 414 S.E.2d at 648.
142. Id. at 131, 414 S.E.2d at 648. "We now hold that the constitutional provision which
-waives immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities." Id., 414 S.E.2d at
649.
143. Id.
144. "In light of the constitutional provision, a statute seeking to reserve sovereign immunity despite the existence of liability insurance cannot stand." Id.
145. Id. at 132, 414 S.E.2d at 649. The court analogized to its decision in Litterilla v.
Hospital Authority, 262 Ga. 34, 413 S.E.2d 718 (1992), discussed infra note 336 and accompanying text.
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peals' approach in Adams, the court declared that "provision of liability
insurance under GIRMA constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity to
the extent of available coverage."""6
G. Zoning
Typically, the zoning controversy of Harrison v. City of Clayton14

manifested itself in the context of a citizen's action in mandamus 1 48
Plaintiff sought a municipal permit to locate, in a prohibited zone, a
structure perceived by the municipality as a "mobile home.''4 Reversing
the trial judge's refusal to issue the mandamus, a unanimous supreme
court applied the "strict construction" approach to municipal zoning or-.
dinances.1s0 The ordinance in issue defined "mobile home" as a structure
possessing "its own chassis,"""1 the court reasoned, a feature not encompassed by plaintiff's proposed structure.152 Accordingly, plaintiff's proposal fell outside the ordinance's prohibition, and a building permit was in
order. 5 s
H.

Authorities

Municipal authorities are, of course, statutory creations; the statute, in
turn, assumes linchpin significance in determining its creation's power
and responsibility. On occasion, however, the authorizing statute's language may imperil the supreme court's perception of Georgia's "public
146. 262 Ga. at 132, 414 S.E.2d at 649. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial judge's
summary judgment in favor of'the defendants. Id. Justices Hunt, Benham, and Fletcher
dissented from the majority opinion on the point of Article I's applicability to municipalities. Id., 414 S.E.2d at 650 (Hunt, J., dissenting). Unlike the state and counties, they maintained, the constitution's waiver provision did not include municipalities. Id. Further, although Article IX, Section I, Paragraph IX did expressly authorize the legislature to waive
municipal immunity, an authorization which the legislature had implemented in O.C.G.A. §
36-33-1(a) to the extent of available municipal insurance, that statutory waiver did not prevail over the GIRMA statute's provision to the contrary. 262 Ga. at 133-34, 414 S.E.2d at
650. Accordingly, the dissenters maintained, municipal participation in GIRMA did not
waive the municipality's immunity in this case. Id. at 132-34, 414 S.E.2d at 650-52.
147. 261 Ga. 513, 407 S.E.2d 731 (1991).
148. For treatment of mandamus in local government law, including its role in zoning,
see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
(1989).
149. 261 Ga. at 513, 407 S.E.2d at 731. The municipal zoning ordinance prohibited mobile homes in single-family residential districts. Id.
150. Id. The court said that zoning ordinances "should be strictly construed in favor of
the property 6wner." Id.
151. '![A] transportable structure, equipped or used for residential purposes, constructed
to be towed on its own chassis." Id.
152. Id. Apparently, there was no controversy on this point.
153. Id.
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policy." The survey period encompassed such an occasion in Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Boswell."" Plaintiff in Boswell
sought compensatory and punitive damages for injuries suffered in a
criminal attack on authority premises. 56 Relying upon statutory language
subjecting the authority to the same tort liability "as any private corporation,'" se the court of appeals upheld plaintiffs claim to punitive
damages.15 7
On review,'"s the Georgia Supreme Court adopted as exclusive rationale
an opinion of the United States Supreme Court assessing the responsibility of "governmental entities" for punitive damages.' 59 Under that assessment, "such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for
whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised."' 0 Further, the governmental entity "can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials," and "[d]amages awarded for punitive purposes, therefore, are not
sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself." ' ' Expressly
adopting those articulations as "the public policy of Georgia,' 62 the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and declared punitive damages
against the authority "impermissible as a matter of law."'6 8

154. 261 Ga. 427, 405 S.E.2d 869 (1991).
155. Id. at 427, 405 S.E.2d at 869.
156. 1965 Ga. Laws 2275 (sec. 22). "The Authority shall not enjoy governmental immunity from tort liability, but shall be liable therefor as any private corporation .... " Id.
157. 261 Ga. at 427, 405 S.E.2d at 869 (citing Boswell v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 196 Ga. App. 902, 397 S.E.2d 165 (1990)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 427-28, 405 S.E.2d at 870. See City of Newport'v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247
(1981).
160. 261 Ga. at 428, 405 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453
U.S. 247, 263 (1981)).
161. Id., 405 S.E.2d at 869 (quoting City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 267
(1981)). The federal couit distinguished the actor himself: "If a government official acts
knowingly and maliciously to (injure others), he may become the appropriate object of the
community's vindictive sentiments." Id., 405 S.E.2d at 870; City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981).
162. 261 Ga. at 428, 405 S.E.2d at 870. "The expression of public policy articulated in
City of Newport is in accordance with the public policy of Georgia." Id.
163. Id. Presiding Justice Smith dissented, charging the court with "nullifying" the express language of the creating statute, with "blindly" ignoring the "plain words of the statute," and with "the most blatant example of judicial legislating that I have ever seen." Id. at
430, 405 S.E.2d at 871 (Smith, J., dissenting). Moreover, "this Court has never condoned
using a federal court case to set Georgia public policy when no United States Constitutional
question is involved." Id.
In the subsequent survey period case of Ballard v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Auth., 200 Ga. App. 880, 410 S.E.2d 49 (1991), the Georgia Court of Appeals, denying punitive damages to yet another authority victim, held the issue foreclosed by the supreme
court's decision in Boswell. Id. at 880-81, 410 S.E.2d at 50.
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II.

A.

COUNTIES

Powers

Again this year, the term "powers" refers to intracounty disputes over
the reach of authority possessed by various county officials.' 4 Typically,
the controversies pit the county commissioners' overall governing power
against the particular conduct of another officer. In all likelihood, the supreme court eventually will be required to examine the issue-particularly the issue of judiciary vs. executive-in some depth. For
the moment, however, the court continued its narrow resolution of the
focused face-off. Sufficient unto the day, it appears, is the evil thereof.
The face-off presented by Stephenson v. Board of Commissioners1"
was one between the county commissioners and the clerk of the superior
court. Specifically, the clerk sought to compel the commissioners to pay
an attorney hired by the clerk"' in defending himself against an inmate's
lawsuit. 67 The supreme court initiated its approach to the conflict by examining the clerk's hiring authority." The search uncovered no express,
implied, or inherent power in the clerk to contract for the services of an
attorney.'6 9 As for the commissioners, they likewise were found devoid of
express power;170 the court's search for implied authority, however, was
more fruitful. "Because the board has the exclusive authority to control
the fiscal affairs of the county and has the power to defend county officers, we conclude the board has the implicit power to employ counsel for
county officers.'
Power thus in place, the court then rejected plaintiff's
secondary contention that its exercise would unconstitutionally "affect"
164. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 43 MERCEit L. REV. 317, 334
(1991).
165. 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991).
166. The attorney hired by the clerk was not one of those employed by the commissioners to do county work. Id. at 399, 405 S.E.2d at 489.
167. The parties agreed that the clerk must have counsel to defend actions against his
office, but each claimed the exclusive authority to hire. Id. at 399-400, 405 S.E.2d at 489.
168. Id. at 400, 405 S.E.2d at 489. The court adhered to the general rule that "neither
the counties of this state nor their officers have the power to do any act. . . not expressly
authorized by a legislative grant of power or necessarily implied from an express legislative
grant of power." Id.
169. Id. "Inherent judicial power is vested in the courts of this state and not in the
clerk's offices thereof." Id.
170. Id. at 401, 405 S.E.2d at 490. The court said that "a county governing authority
does not have the express power to hire attorneys" under either the constitution or statutes.
Id.
171. Id. For exclusive power over fiscal affairs, the court relied upon the local statutes
creating the board. For the power to defend officers, the court relied upon O.C.G.A. § 45-921. O.C.G.A. § 45-9-21 (1990 & Supp. 1992); 261 Ga. at 401, 405 S.E.2d at 490.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

judicial personnel. 17 2 "The board's employment of counsel does not by
itself negatively impact on the ability of [the clerk] or his personnel to
carry out their duties.

1

7

Accordingly, the clerk's effort to mandamus

17 4
payment of his attorney's fees came to naught.
The case of Cramer v. Spalding County'" pitted the commissioners
against the county's state court judge. Specifically, the commissioners
challenged the judge's indefinite appointments of a second judge and assistant solicitor, and his financing those appointments from court
funds. M Again, the supreme court sided with the commissioners.'1 " In
failing to "specify either the scope or length" of his appointees' services,
the judge exceeded both legislatively established procedures and any inherent judicial power.17 8 Indeed, the appointments "usurped both legislative and executive functions of government,"1 9 the court elaborated, and
"[sitate court judges do not have the inherent power to order a county to
pay for judicial positions."' ""eWith local statutes specifying the salaries of
judicial officials, the court simply could not abide the judge's effort to
reestablish a version of the infamous "fee system."' 81 Accordingly,
the
182
court reversed dismissal of the commissioners' challenge.

B. Officers and Employees
County personnel controversies of the period turned primarily on such
typical concerns as position vacancies, discipline procedures, and conflicts
of interest. Of these, the supreme court's resolution of Fulton v. Bakerls '
constituted by far the most intriguing exercise. That scenario encompassed a vacancy on the county commission, with the remaining commissioners, on February 11, appointing plaintiff to the unexpired term as
172.

261 Ga. at 402, 405 S.E.2d at 490. See GA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(1) and (7)

(1983).
173, 261 Ga. at 402, 405 S.E.2d at 490.
174. Id.
175. 261 Ga. 570, 409 S.E.2d 30 (1991).
176. Id. at 570, 409- S.E.2d at 31. The judge acted via orders of appointment and by
having the clerk withhold from county funds monies collected as fines and forfeitures. Id.
177. Id. at 575, 409 S.E.2d at 35.
178. Id. at 573-74, 409 S.E.2d at 34. The court reviewed O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1, the Uniform Superior Court Rules, O.C.G.A. § 15-7-25, and O.C.G.A. § 15-18-5(a), and found them
insufficient. 261 Ga. at 573-74, 409 S.E.2d at 34.
179. 261 Ga. at 574, 409 S.E.2d at 34.
180. Id. at 575, 409 S.E.2d at 35.
181. Id. at 574-75, 409 S.E.2d at 34. "A state court's remedy for the county's nonpayment of a court-related expense is limited to mandamus in the superior court." Id. at 575,
409 S.E.2d at 35.
182. Id.
183. 261 Ga. 710, 410 S.E.2d 735 (1991).
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then provided by law. Taking effect on February 25, a local statute required that commission vacancies be filled by special election and declared itself retroactive to any vacancies occurring after the preceding
first day of January.9 4 Reviewing the trial judge's rejection of plaintiffs
challenge to the statute, the supreme court assayed the measure as meeting the two prerequisites of an unconstitutional "bill of attainder. '1 8
First, "the provision applies to a limited class of easily identifiable individuals;"r 8 and second, "the act inflicts punishment iii a 'trial by legislature.' "187 The court thus declared the statute's retroactive provision violative of both the Georgia and federal constitutions. 8s
A deputy sheriff's demotion and suspension gave rise to a due process
complaint against both the sheriff and county in Floyd v. Chaffin.1s" The
court of appeals responded that because the county had never adopted an
ordinance to the contrary,19 0 sheriff's department employees were not
county employees and thus were not entitled to county disciplinary procedures.' 9" As for the sheriff, the court relied upon uncontroverted evi92
dence that plaintiff received notice and "a full predeprivation hearing.' 1
Finally, the court discounted the fact that a chief detective had served
both as chief investigator of the matter and as chairman of the disciplinary review board. 93 That fact, the court held, failed to constitute a de4
nial of plaintiff's due process. 1
184. Id. at 711, 410 S.E.2d at 736. The statute was introduced in the General Assembly
one day following plaintiff's appointment to the vacancy; it specifically stated that any appointee after January 1 would serve only temporarily until an election. See 1991 Ga. Laws
3501.
185. 261 Ga. at 712, 410 S.E.2d at 737.
186. Id. "It affects exclusively persons that the ...commissioners appoint between January 1, 1991 and February 25, 1991." Id.
187. Id. "The local act, not a court of law, mandates that [plaintiff] forfeit her office.
When the General Assembly passed this act, [plaintiff] was the only person who could be
punished by removal from office." Id.
188. Id. at 713, 410 S.E.2d at 737; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 10 (1983); U.S. CONsT. art.

I, § 9.
189. 201 Ga. App. 597, 411 S.E.2d 570 (1991). The cause for the disciplinary action was
plaintiff's entry of a home without a search warrant. Id. at 598, 411 S.E.2d at 572.
190. O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
191. 201 Ga. App. at 597-98, 411 S.E.2d at 571. The county therefore was not a proper
party and was not required to respond to plaintiff's discovery motions. Id. at 598, 411 S.E.2d
at 571.
192. Id., 411 S.E.2d at 572.
193. Id. at 599, 411 S.E.2d at 572-73. It was uncontroverted that the detective chief did
not participate in the board's vote, and plaintiff had presented no'evidence of the chief's
unfairness. Id. at 599-600, 411 S.E.2d at 573.
194. Id. at 600, 411 S.E.2d at 573. The court thus affirmed summary judgments for defendants. Id.
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In Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc. v. West, 9 ' the issue was whether an
attorney, also a county commissioner, should be disqualified from representing one private party against another in the county's state court. 1 "
Argument for disqualification rested upon the fact that county commissioners voted on salary supplements for state court judges.197 The commissioner-attorney's practice before the judge, it was contended, gave the
appearance of "professional impropriety."'9 Rejecting that argument, the
court of appeals relied upon the points that the commissioners possessed
no power to remove state court judges, and that this commissioner never
Voted on the judges' salary supplements. 19" Accordingly, the court held no
"employer-employee relationship" to be present, and no disqualification
was necessary.2 0
The "impropriety-disqualification" contention in Otwell v. Floyd
201
County Board of Commissioners
operated from another perspective.
There plaintiff citizen sued to enjoin the county's construction of a government complex and sought to disqualify the county attorney from the
case.2 0 2 Plaintiff asserted that the attorney owned land surrounding the
proposed complex-land that would increase in value upon the complex's
construction. That ownership, plaintiff maintained, afforded the attorney
a self-interest in the case and required his disqualification.202 Once again,
the court of appeals proved unreceptive: "The record is devoid of any
evidence presented by [plaintiff] that [defendants'] attorneys did in fact
have an interest in the litigation or how [plaintiff] and the other citizens
she purported to represent would be harmed by the attorneys' represen20°4
tation of [defendants].

195. 200 Ga. App. 402, 408 S.E.2d 180 (1991).
196. The suit was one for personal injury. Id. at 402, 408 S.E.2d at 181.
197.

Id. See O.C.G.A. § 15-7-22 (1990).

198. 200 Ga. App. at 402, 408 S.E.2d at 181. See
SIBILITY Canon 9 (1981).

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-

199. The commissioner had testified that this would continue to be his policy. 200 Ga.
App. at 402, 408 S.E.2d at 181.
200. Id. at 403, 408 S.E.2d at 182. The court thus affirmed the state court judge's denial
of disqualification. Id.
201. 200 Ga. App. 596, 408 S.E.2d 799 (1991).
202.

Plaintiff's petition was one pro se. Id. at 596, 408 S.E.2d at 799.

203. Id., 408 S.E.2d at 799-800.
204. Id. at 596-97, 408 S.E.2d at 800. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's refusal to
disqualify. Id. at 597, 408 S.E.2d at 800.
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C. Openness
Openness in local government comes, of course, at a monetary cost.2
Although citizens are entitled to records of government business, the
costs of providing those records threaten the general public with a considerable economic burden. Georgia's Open Records Act seeks to strike a
balance by authorizing the government to charge copying fees for re207
quested public records.2 0 Trammell v. Martin
encompassed a county's

effort to collect such fees following compliance with plaintiff's request for
a "detailed statement" of all bills for legal services from a named law
firm, as well as "any other billing to the County by any other person or
firm for fiscal year ending June 30, 1990. ' 208 The court of appeals rejected
plaintiff's argument that he should not be liable for the costs of copying
indigent defense bills. 2 0 ' First, the court stressed the "clear and unambig-

uous language" of plaintiff's request;21 and second, the court noted plaintiff's decision to order copies prior to making an inspection.2 1 1 "Because
plaintiff requested the documents to be copied, the trial court did not
err
12
in ordering him to pay those copying costs authorized" by the Act. '
The mandate of the Open Meetings Act2ls also projects balanced perspectives. As for basic applicability, the court in Kilgore v. R. W. Page
Corp.2 14 held the Act to stymie a county coroner's effort at closing an
inquest.2 1' Characterizing an inquest as a "meeting" within the meaning
of the Act,"" the supreme court turned to possible exceptions.21 7 Emphasizing the absence of an express exception for "pending criminal investi205. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local Government
Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
206. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
207. 200 Ga. App. 435, 408 S.E.2d 477 (1991).
208. Id. at 435, 408 S.E.2d at 478. The county had supplied copies of over 5,500 pages of
bills, including bills for indigent defense fees, at a copying cost of over $2,000. Id.
209. Id. at 436, 408 S.E.2d at 479. Plaintiff argued that the county should have known he
did not desire the indigent defense bills. Id. at 435-36, 408 S.E.2d at 478.
210. Id. at 436, 408 S.E.2d at 478.
211. Id., 408 S.E.2d at 479. The court noted the Act's provision of a right of inspection
and the usual practice of first inspecting and then selecting only the desired records. Id.
212. Id. The court did reverse and remand in respect to that part of the bill for adult
indigent cases, to make certain that the county had used the most economical manner of
providing that information to plaintiff. Id. The court noted that the county regularly prepared a summary of those bills every six months and that these summaries might have more
economically provided plaintiff with information as to these particular charges. Id.
213. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
214. 261 Ga. 410, 405 S.E.2d 655 (1991).
215. Id. at 411,'405 S.E.2d at 656.
216. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(a)(2) (1990 & Supp. 1992). The court supplied no supporting
rationale for the announcement.
217. 261 Ga. at 411, 405 S.E.2d at 657.
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gations, ' ' 21 0 the court considered the Act's exemption of meetings of a
"law enforcement agency."'2 1' On grounds that a coroner possesses no enforcement authority, however, and that a coroner's verdict does not con-

stitute an indictment, the court concluded that "a coroner should not be
considered a 'law enforcement agency' for purposes" of the exception. 20
As for violation consequences, the court employed the decision in
Steele u. Honea2 21 to address the following issue: "Whether a claimed violation of the Open Meetings Act is a ground for recall of a public officer

under the 1989 Recall Act.1222 On grounds that the Open Meetings Act
requires that "every meeting of the county commission be open to the
public" 2 23 (unless expressly excepted), the court announced that a commissioner's participation in a2 2closed meeting "can become a 'ground for
recall' under the Recall Act."1 '
D. Regulation
County regulatory activities during the survey period were synonymous

with the licensing of beer.2 2 ' The case of Thomas u. Madison County
Board of Commissioners2" featured old brew, but in a somewhat different container. Plaintiff applicants for a license, following county denial,
sought to excuse their failure to pursue a hearing before the county com-

218. Id., 405 S.E.2d at 656. The court examined O.C.G.A. § 50-14-3, found no "criminal
investigation" exception, and no grant of authority for the court "to fashion a public-interest test for determining whether meetings required to be open by the Act should nevertheless be closed." 261 Ga. at 411, 405 S.E.2d at 656-57.
219. 261 Ga. at 411, 405 S.E.2d at 657. See O.C.G.A. § 50-14-3(3) (1990 & Supp. 1992).
The court emphasized that exceptions were to be narrowly construed. 261 Ga. at 411, 405
S.E.2d at 657.
220. 261 Ga. at 412, 405 S.E.2d at 657. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's order
that the inquest be open. Id.
221. 261 Ga. 644, 409 S.E.2d 652 (1991).
222. Id. at 644, 409 S.E:2d at 653. Recall petitions had been filed under O.C.G.A. § 21-43 against county commissioners charging them with malfeasance and misconduct for allegedly participating in closed meetings of the commission. 261 Ga. at 644, 409 S.E.2d at 653.
For treatment of local government recall, see generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Remembering
Recall in Local Government Law, 10 GA.L. REv. 883 (1976).
223. 261 Ga. at 645, 409 S.E.2d at 654 (footnote omitted).
224. Id. In this particular case, however, the court was unable to hold that the trial
judge's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, and thus affirmed the decision that the petitions for recall were insufficient, Id. at 646, 409 S.E.2d at 654. Justice Fletcher concurred to
emphasize the "extremely limited nature of the judicial review" afforded by the Recall Act.
Id. at 647, 409 S.E.2d at 654-55 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
225. This is not unusual; see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor
Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REv. 1039 (1981).
226. 261 Ga. 265, 404 S.E.2d 271 (1991).
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missioners.'" Their reason for filing a mandamus action, plaintiffs proffered, was that a county representative told them "it would be useless to
seek a hearing before the board concerning the denial because the board's
decision would not change. ' 2 8 Rejecting that excuse, the supreme court
affirmed denial of the mandamus"'s for the reason that "all administra30
tive remedies had not been exhausted."'
The court in Groverstein v. Effingham County' s' then focused upon the
actual conduct of a required license revocation hearing. The supreme
court recounted the transpiring procedures: a charged violation of the
county ordinance by selling beer to a minor, a county hearing on revocation, a detective's testimony on the violation but no identification of the
purchaser, and a Vote to revoke.2" Relying upon a deficiency of due process,28 the court asserted that "the only direct evidence that appellants
actually violated [the county ordinance] by selling beer to the purchaser,
was the equivocal hearsay testimony of the detective, based upon what
the purchaser told him.'' 4 On grounds that the hearing thus "did not
comport with the fundamental requirements of due process," the court
reversed the license revocation."'

227. Id. at 266, 404 S.E.2d at 272. Plaintiffs maintained that the county's denial was
based upon a ground not included in the county ordinance. That ordinance specifically provided for license hearings before the board. Id. See also O.C.G.A. § 3-3-2 (1990).
228.

261 Ga. at 266, 404 S.E.2d at 272 (footnote omitted).

229. Id. For treatment of the popularity of the mandamus action in local government
law, and its frequent failure, see R, PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989).
230. 261 Ga. at 266, 404 S.E.2d at 272. For a period context in which the court was far,
less concerned with statutory procedures, see Gwinnett County v. Bolin, 262 Ga. 67, 414
S.E.2d 225 (1992), an attack upon a county sales tax election on grounds that the board of
elections had failed to properly call the election. Bolin, 262 Ga. at 67-68, 414 S.E.2d at 225.
Conceding technical violation of the county ordinance, the court refused to void the election: "The failure on the part of a public officer to perform an incidental function that is
purely mechanistic should not invalidate an expression of the will of the people that is regular in other respects." Id. at 69, 414 S.E.2d at 226.
231.

262 Ga. 45, 414 S.E.2d 207 (1992).

232.

Id. at 45, 414 S.E.2d at 208-09.

233. The court noted O.C.G.A. § 3-3-2. The statute requires local government due process, including an opportunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses. See O.C.G.A. § 3-3-2
(1990).
234.

262 Ga. at 48-49, 414 S.E.2d at 211.

235. Id. Although the court said that cross examining "opposing witnesses" did not include the purchaser not present at the hearing, "[n]evertheless, appellants were entitled to a
fair hearing." Id. at 48, 414 S.E.2d at 211.
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E. Legislation
Local legislation constitutes a legendary fixture in Georgia local government law.2 3 Of the issues traditionally surrounding such legislation, none
is more perplexing than its relationship to general statutes. The period
under survey
presented the supreme court with two instances of the
37
2

perplexity.

Glynn County Board of Education v. Lane2 38 involved a contention of
conflict between general and local legislative provisions on county school
audits.2 3 General statutes require the State Department of Audits to con-

duct an annual audit of all state school systems, and authorize local
school boards to have an additional audit 240 In Lane the county school
board argued those statutes to invalidate a local statute requiring a school
audit by independent certified public accountants.2 1' The court summa-

rily rejected that argument,2 ' 2 denying the existence of a conflict: "The
local act which provides for an independent audit . .

.

does not conflict

with the general act but simply requires [the local school board] to do
that which the general act says it may do."
The conflict contention elicited constitutional support in Groverstein v.
Effingham County,24" and received more (but to no avail) solicitude from
the supreme court. The challenged local legislation was a county ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer or wine to a minor.2 4 5 Challengers characterized that ordinance as a special law constitutionally preempted by a
general statute prohibiting the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a minor.2 46 In an analysis of two-pronged significance, the supreme court
236. For treatment of various facets of this fixture, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Legislation in Georgia: The Notice Requirement, 7 GA. L. REv. 22 (1972); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Selected Oddities in Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. REv. 783 (1975); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., When is a Special Law Unlawfully Special?, 27 MERCER L. REv. 1167 (1976); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Unlawful Special Laws: A Postscripton the Proscription,30 MERCER L.
REV. 319 (1978).

237. See Glynn County Board of Education v. Lane', 261 Ga. 544, 407 S.E.2d 754 (1991);
Groverstein v. Efflingham County, 262 Ga. 45, 414 S.E.2d 207 (1992).
238. 261 Ga. 544, 407 S.E.2d 754 (1991).
239. Id. at 546, 407 S.E.2d at 756.
240. See O.C.G.A. § 50-6-6 (1990).
241. 261 Ga. at 546, 407 S.E.2d at 756. See 1965 Ga. Laws 3309. The accountant could
not be a member or employee of the school board. 261 Ga. at 546, 407 S.E.2d at 756.
242. Id. The court thus upheld the trial judge's mandate of an independent audit. Id.
243. Id. "We do not view this as a conflict." Id. Justice Bell dissented without opinion.
Id.
244. 262 Ga. 45, 414 S.E.2d 207 (1992).
245. Id. at 45, 414 S.E.2d at 208.
246. O.C.G.A. § 3-3-23 (1990). The Georgia Constitution (presently Art. III, § 6, para.
4(a)) has long declared that "[]aws of a general nature shall have uniform operation
throughout this state and. no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which
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turned back the challenge2"47 First, there simply was no prohibited conflict. The effect of the ordinance, the court insisted, was "to prohibit sales
to minors under more specific circumstances than does [the general statute's] general prohibition against furnishing alcoholic beverages to minors." 4 Adopting the test earlier evolved in City of Atlanta v. Associ249
ated Builders & Contractors of Georgia,
the court viewed the
ordinance to "only augment and strengthen" the general statute, rather
than to "detract" from it.250 Second, the court highlighted the following
modification of the constitution's prohibition against special laws "in any
case" provided for by general law: "except that the General Assembly
may by general law authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers which do not conflict with general
laws. 2 5 1 On grounds that the general statute gave local governments "discretionary powers" in regulating alcoholic beverages, 52 the court declared
an "express authorization" by the general statute for the county
2 53
ordinance.
F.

Liability

Actions against county school systems made their mark upon the period under study. Initially, Cook v. Colquitt County Board of Education5 4 reaffirmed the rule that "a county board of education, unlike the
school district which it manages, is not a body corporate and does not
have the capacity to sue or be sued. 2 5 This rule's only exception occurs
provision has been made by an existing general law." GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4(a). For
discussion of the history of this mandate, and its twisting trail of application by the appellate courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., When is a Special Law Unlawfully Special?, 27 MERCER L. REV,1167 (1976).
247. 262 Ga. at 46, 414 S.E.2d at 210-11.
248. Id. at 47, 414 S.E.2d at 210.
249. 240 Ga. 655, 242 S.E.2d 139 (1978). For discussion of this case, and its newly
evolved "test," see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Unlawful Special Laws: A Postscripton the Proscription, 30 MERCER L. REV. 319 (1978).
250. 262 Ga. at 47, 414 S.E.2d at 210.
251. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4(a); 262 Ga. at 46-47, 414 S.E.2d at 209. This modification was added to the historic mandate in the 1983 Georgia Constitution. For discussion
of it and its potential, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and the Constitution of 1983: Selected Shorts, in ADDITIONAL STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
565 (1983).
252. "Each such local governing authority is given discretionary powers within the
guidelines of due process set forth in this Code section as to the granting or refusal, suspension, or revocation of the permits or licenses." O.C.G.A. § 3-3-2(a) (1990).
253. 262 Ga. at 47, 414 S.E.2d at 210. Still, the court noted, the ordinance could not be
in conflict with the general statute. Id.
254. 261 Ga. 841, 412 S.E.2d 828 (1992).
255. Id. at 841, 412 S.E.2d at 828.
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when the statute creating the board so provides, the supreme court declared, and the Constitution of 1983 made no change in the matter.,
The court of appeals was equally unreceptive to a student's action in
Wayne County Board of Education v. Tyre,25 7 alleging due process violations in plaintiff's three day disciplinary suspension.2 " The court recounted evidence that plaintiff was made aware of the charge against him
shortly after the incident25 s and was then given an opportunity to answer
that charge.2 0 "This," the court asserted, "eliminated all genuine issues
of material fact regarding plaintiff's claim that [he] was not afforded procedural due process. 1261
Alleged county "takings" accounted for several instances of litigation;
none were successful.2 " Amos Plumbing & Electric Co. v. Bennett'3 featured an action by the owner of a private water system for the county's
installation of a competing system.2" ' Canvassing possibilities, the supreme court alluded to whether the county's actions had physically damaged plaintiff's property, or whether plaintiff held either an exclusive
franchise or a "no-compete contract. '2' s Answering in the negative, the
court found plaintiff's only damage to be the loss of "its business with
customers who chose to tap on to the county system. 2 6e6 That damage,
the court held, was insufficient to trigger county responsibility "under the
taking clause of the Georgia Constitution." 267
256. Id., 412 S.E.2d at 828-29. Specifically, the court held that neither GA. CONSTw.
art. I,
§ 2, para. 9 (1983), nor its amendment "create any new entities or bodies corporate, nor
destroy any old ones." 261 Ga. at 842, 412 S.E.2d at 829. Chief Justice Clarke and Presiding
Justice Weltner dissented without opinions. Id.
257. 199 Ga. App. 384, 404 S.E.2d 809 (1991).
258. Id. at 384, 404 S.E.2d at 810.
259. The incident occurred during a Saturday outdoor band competition, and the band
director then told plaintiff that he must appear before the assistant principal on Monday in
respect to a disciplinary suspension. Id. at 384-85, 404 S.E.2d at 810.
260. Id. at 385, 404 S.E.2d at 811. Plaintiff went before the assistant principal on Monday, was told of the charge, and, upon failure to explain, was suspended for three days. Id.,
404 S.E.2d at 810.
261. Id. at 386, 404 S.E.2d at 811. The court reversed the trial judge's refusal to grant
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id.
,
262. For treatment of facets of local government takings, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Condemning Local Government Condemnation, 39 MERCas L. REV. 11 (1987).
263. 261 Ga. 810, 411 S.E.2d 490 (1992).
264. Id. at 810, 411 S.E.2d at 490. Plaintiff had acquired the water system from a subdivision's developer and had distributed water to the subdivision since 1987. Id.
265. Id. at 811, 411 S.E.2d at 490-91. "Thus, the developer's contractual grant to [plaintiff) cannot be construed to prevent the county from constructing and maintaining a competing water system." Id., 411 S.E.2d at 491.
266. Id.
267. Id.; GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1 (1983). The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
dismissal of plaintiff's action. 261 Ga. at 811-12, 411 S.E.2d at 491.
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The court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in Provost v. Gwinnett County, 2 s' concerning land damage due to increased water run-off
from county-approved upstream construction.2 6 Acknowledging prior impositions of liability for takings that created nuisances,' 0 the court

viewed those cases to require both county approval of the upstream development and failure to maintain a culvert.2 7' Drawing the line, the
court construed the evidence to show only the county's approval of the
upstream project and "an increase in water, sediment and debris flowing
freely through a culvert onto [plaintiffs'] property."' 2 72 Absent the defective drainage, the court sustained a directed verdict for the county.2 78
Puckett v.Gwinnett County"7 concerned land taken from plaintiff by

a county's road realignment some fourteen years earlier.17 1 On grounds
that plaintiff had not submitted a written claim to the county within
twelve months of accrual, as required by statute,' 7 the court rejected the
complaint.2 7 7 It was immaterial that for a period of thirteen years, county
officials had assured plaintiff he would receive compensation and had
promised that the situation would be "looked into. 2 7 8 Those verbal com-

mitments were insufficient, the court concluded, to toll the running of the
27
notice requirement. '
In actions against counties for personal injury and wrongful death,
cases of the period cautioned claimants not to forget the standard de-0
fenses of traditional tort law. For instance, Welch v.Douglas County8
featured a claim for injury sustained when plaintiff stepped on a nail in a
268. 199 Ga. App. 713, 405 S.E.2d 754 (1991).
269. Id. at 713, 405 S.E.2d at 755.
270. For discussion of the law of county nuisances, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia
County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REv. 1 (1991).
271. 199 Ga. App. at 715, 405 S.E.2d at 756. The court cited City of Lawrenceville v.
Heard, 194 Ga. App. 580, 391 S.E.2d 441 (1990).
272. 199 Ga. App. at 714, 405 S.E.2d at 756.
273. Id. at 715, 405 S.E.2d at 757.
274. 200 Ga. App. 53, 406 S.E.2d 561 (1991).
275. Id. at 53, 406 S.E.2d at 561. Subsequently, plaintiff's construction company had
paved the road and over the years plaintiff had sold lots by deeds referring to the new road
as the boundary line. Id.
276. O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 (1987). For treatment of the county notice requirement, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Claims Against Counties: The Difference A Year Makes, 36 MERCER L.
Rav. 1 (1984). The court said that "[tlhis bar is likewise applicable in suits seeking to recover against a county for depreciation in market value of the property taken due to the
alleged creation and maintenance of a continuing nuisance." 200 Ga. App. at 54, 406 S.E.2d
at 562.
277. 200 Ga. App. at 54, 406 S.E.2d at 562.
278. Id. at 53, 406 S.E.2d at 562.
279. Id. at 54, 406 S.E.2d at 562. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the county. Id.
280. 199 Ga. App. 269, 404 S.E.2d 450 (1991).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

board at the county's ball field. 281 Affirming summary judgment for the
county, the court of appeals relied squarely upon the Georgia Recreational Property Act.2 82 Under that statute, land owners (both private and

public) are freed from the duty of care for the safety of those who use the
premises for recreational purposes without payment of a fee. 283 The court
rejected plaintiff's contentions that the county had waived statutory immunity by maintaining the property28" and by purchasing liability insurance.2 5 The only available waiver, the court posited, was wilful and malicious conduct, and plaintiff offered no evidence of such conduct on the
county's part. 88
Making essentially the same point, Turner v. Walker County' 7
presented an action for the wrongful death of plaintiff's husband.2 8 8 Dece-

dent was killed while performing a misdemeanor sentence of community
service by operating the county's front-end loader at the county landfill.2 89 Spurning plaintiff's arguments of defective equipment 290 and
county liability insurance, 8 1 the court seized upon the exculpation agreement signed by the decedent.2 " That agreement established a "complete
defense" to the action,2 s the court asserted, and, because it would have
barred decedent had he lived,
was good against decedent's representatives
29
in a wrongful death action.

1

281. Id. at 269, 404 S.E.2d at 451. Plaintiff attended a baseball game at the field where
her brother played. Id.
282. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (1982); 199 Ga. App. at 270, 404 S.E.2d at 452.
283. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-22 (1982).
284. 199 Ga. App. at 270, 404 S.E.2d at 451. "Under plaintiff's construction, a landowner
would enjoy immunity only if he essentially abandoned the property and did nothing to
maintain it." Id.
285. Id. "Plaintiff confuses sovereign immunity with the specific limitation of duty
granted to any landowner, public or private, by the Recreational Property Act." Id., 404
S.E.2d at 451-52.
286. Id., 404 S.E.2d at 452. The court reasoned that this exception, required wilful failure
to guard or warn which, in turn, required the county's actual knowledge of the hazard. Id.
287. 200 Ga. App. 565, 408 S.E.2d 818 (1991).
288. Id. at 565, 408 S:E.2d at 819.
289. Id. Plaintiff's decedent had represented he was an experienced heavy equipment
operator and had requested to do work of that nature. He was killed when the loader overturned. Id.
290. Le., the absence of roll bars. Id.
291. Le., a liability policy covering both the loader and the landfill premises. Id.
292. Id. The agreement expressl assumed liability for any injury sustained and promised not to institute proceedings against the entity involved. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 566, 408 S.E.2d at 819. The court held that the only exception to the agreement would be wilful or wanton conduct, and remanded for a determination on whether the
county's liability insurance covered such conduct in which event the county's sovereign immunity would be waived to that extent. Id., 408 S.E.2d at 820.
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As recounted earlier, 9 5 the supreme court's 1985 decision in Toombs
2 " included counties among the state's "departments
County v. O'NealJ
and agencies" that, under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX, of the Constitution of 1983, waived sovereign immunity by obtaining liability insurance. 2 1 In 1990, the voters ratified an amendment to the Article I provision that operated to extend sovereign immunity to all state departments
and agencies, regardless of insurance."" A long-festering controversy over
the validity of that amendment, centered upon the nebulous wording of
the 1990 ballot, came to a head in the survey period case of Donaldson v.
2s
" In Donaldson the supreme court held
Department of Transportation.
valid ratification to depend not upon the voters understanding the
amendment, but simply upon whether the ballot language "was sufficient
to indicate which amendment was being voted on."3 0 0 Applying that test,

the court held the amendment valid against challengers' attacks,30 ' but

only prospective in its effect.3 0 2 Accordingly, the amendment "does not

In Battallia v. City of Columbus, 199 Ga. App. 897, 406 S.E.2d 290 (1991), the court employed a presumption that the General Assembly obtained federal preclearance in consolidating local governments, as required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1981)), and held that the defendant consolidated government enjoyed county immunity to
an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff from a fall in the street. Id. at 898, 406 S.E.2d at
291. For background on the preclearance issue, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Federalizing
Through the Franchise: The Supreme Court and Local Government, 6 GA. L. R~v. 34
(1971).
295. See text accompanying supra notes 125, 126. See also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia
Local Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis" Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 19 (1986).
296. 254 Ga. 390, 330 S.E.2d 95 (1985).
297. Id. at 391, 330 S.E.2d at 96. See also Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129, 414
S.E.2d 647 (1992), discussed in text accompanying supra note 136, extending the Article I
provision to municipalities as well.
298. 1990 Ga. Laws 2435. This amendment provides that sovereign immunity of the
state and its departments and agencies can be waived only by the General Assembly's enactment of a State Tort Claims Act. Id.
299. 262 Ga. 49, 414 S.E.2d 638 (1992). Challengers argued that the language of the ballot was affirmatively misleading in causing voters to think they were voting for less governmental immunity when the amendment actually provided for more immunity. Id. at 50, 414
S.E.2d at 639.
300. Id. at 51, 414 S.E.2d at 640.
301. Id., 414 S.E.2d at 641. The court viewed the ballot language as incomplete but not
affirmatively misleading, and denied the certainty that the amendment would increase government immunity: "It may indeed stimulate the passage of a tort claims act." Id. at 52, 414
S.E.2d at 641. Presiding Justice Weltner, joined by Justice Benham, dissented with the position that the ballot language was affirmatively misleading and that the amendment should
be held invalid. Id. at 53, 414 S.E.2d at 644 (Weltner, J., dissenting).
302. 262 Ga. at 53, 414 S.E.2d at 641. "The amendment ... is silent on the issue of
retroactive application. We conclude therefore that the legislature intended prospective application only." Id.
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act to withdraw any waiver of sovereign immunity for actions pending on
January 1, 1991, the amendment's effective date."30 3
Two days later, in Papp v. Hall County,30 4 the supreme court applied
Donaldson directly to counties. Papp presented a wrongful death action
against a county, filed in 1988. The trial judge dismissed the action, despite the existence of county liability insurance, in reliance upon the 1991
amendment to the Article I provision.305 Reversing, the supreme court
simply hoisted Donaldson's declaration "that the amendment at issue is
not to be retroactively applied."30
G.

Zoning

The supreme court took yet another step 30' in evolving the construction
' 8
of general statutes comprising the "Zoning Procedures Law. 30
Specifically, the court in Atlanta Bio-Med, Inc. v. DeKalb Countys focused
upon a text amendment to a county zoning ordinance, an amendment allowing medical waste incinerators in commercial and heavy industrial
zoned districts. 10 One of the issues presented by the case was whether
the amendment constituted a "rezoning decision" subject to the Procedures Law's requirements that the involved property's location be published and the property posted with a sign.3 11 Reversing the trial judge,
the supreme court held those requirements inapplicable ,to the county's
"enactment of a zoning ordinance text amendment that allows a new permitted use. '3 13 The court's analysis restricted the requirements to zoning
decisions affecting "a single parcel or a limited number of parcels of prop-

303. Id. at 54, 414 S.E.2d at 642. Because this action was filed on June 3, 1988, the court
thus reversed the trial judge's dismissal of the action against the Department of Transportation. Id.
304. 262 Ga. 72, 414 S.E.2d 655 (1992).
305. Id. at 72, 414 S.E.2d at 655.
306. Id. It should be noted that after the close of the survey period, the supreme court
decided Curtis v. Board of Regents, 262 Ga. 226, 416 S.E.2d 510 (1992), holding that the
1991 amendment also did not apply even to actions filed after January 1, 1991, but which
accrued prior to that date. Id. at 228, 416 S.E.2d at 511. For such actions, the 1983 Article I
immunity waiver provision applies.
307. For last year's contribution, see Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County, 261 Ga.
153, 401 S.E.2d 527 (1991), noted in R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 43 MERCER L. REV. 317, 350 (1991).
308. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4 (1987).
309. 261 Ga. 594, 408 S.E.2d 100 (1991).
310. Id. at 594, 408 S.E.2d at 101. The local governing authority had adopted the
amendment and then attempted to rescind it; the court eventually held the amendment
valid and the attempted recision invalid. Id. at 596, 408 S.E.2d at 102.
311. Id. at 595; 408 S.E.2d at 102; O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(b) (1987).
312. 261 Ga. at 595, 408 S.E.2d at 102.
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they did not apply to ordinance text amendments that 1"would
4

affect all property in the county zoned for heavy industrial use."

Featuring a distinctly different concern, the decision in Michiels v.
Fulton County31 5 posited a point on the graph of local government zoning
arguably intersected by the law of estoppel.831 Specifically, plaintiff property owners hoisted the concept of equitable estoppel against the county's
recission (roughly one year after issuance) of a permit for a driveway curb
cut.3 1 7 Initially assessing the. permit to violate the county's zoning ordi-

nance, 38 the supreme court termed the permit's issuance "clearly an unauthorized act."81 9 Said the court: "the clerk who performed that ministerial function had neither the authority to waive any of the conditions of
the zoning ordinance nor the authority to issue a curb cut permit which
violated any of those conditions.""" 0 Because zoning is an undeniable
"governmental function," the court embraced the precept that ""equitable estoppel will not apply so as to frustrate or contravene a governmental function of a governmental unit.' 2"'2 Accordingly, the court sustained
the county's recission of the permit.

H. Authorities
The survey period proved to be an important one for county hospital
authorities. The nebulous issue of calculating punitive damages recaptured the supreme court's attention in Hospital Authority v. Jones, s28 an
earlier decision 314 remanded by the United States Supreme Court for re313. Id.
314. Id. The court said that the fact that proponents of the amendment "had a specific
parcel of property in mind for the development of their medical waste incinerator does not
change the character of the zoning decision." Id.
315. 261 Ga. 395, 405 S.E.2d 40 (1991).
316. For treatment of that intersection in context see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DocTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1985).
317. 261 Ga.'at 397, 405 S.E.2d at 42.
318. Id. "It is also clear that in approving the petition for rezoning, the commissioners,
as a condition of the rezoning, intended that there was to be no access from the subdivision
lots directly onto Riverside Drive." Id.
319. Id.

320. Id.
321. Id. (quoting Corey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Board of Zoning, 254 Ga. 221, 327
S.E.2d 178 (1985)).
322. Id. at 397-98, 405 S.E.2d at 42. Presiding Justice Smith dissented without opinion.
Id. at 398, 405 S.E.2d at 42.
323. 261 Ga. 613, 409 S.E.2d 501 (1991). The case raised neither the issue of immunity
nor the appropriateness per se of punitive damages against a hospital authority.
324. Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 259 Ga. 759, 386 S.E.2d 120 (1989). The case involved
physical injury to a patient being airlifted to the authority's hospital when the helicopter
crashed. The theory of liability rested upon an alleged authority policy of diverting patients
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consideration.32 5 Having originally upheld a sizeable jury award of punitive damages against the hospital authority, the court had "rejected the
notion that punitive damages must necessarily bear some. relationship to
the actual damages awarded by the jury. ''3 2 On this second presentation
of the issue, the court found nothing in the federal point of reference to
demand a different resolution.32 1 The deterrence purpose of punitive
damages remained unaffected by the happenstance that plaintiff received
only slight actual harm.2 s The "potential harm to other patients" warranted the punitive award. 28 "Society's interest would seem better served
by deterring objectionable conduct at the first opportunity so that the
potentially greater injury which might otherwise be caused by such con33 0
duct might be avoided."
The supreme court's most noteworthy pronouncement on hospital authorities came essentially as a follow-up to its 1989 decision in Self v.
City of Atlanta.3 31 In Self the court dramatically reversed its field and
held that legislative "sue and be sued" language appearing in enabling
statutes would no longer constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.8 2 In
1991, the court of appeals applied Self to conclude that hospital authorities "are entitled to the defense of governmental immunity except to the
'
extent there has been a waiver under the constitutional provision." 33
Further, the court held that the new rule of Self applied retroactively to
cases already filed prior to that decision.3 3 ' Finally, the court of appeals
to the authority's' own hospital. The jury awarded $5,001 in actual damages and $1,300,000
in punitive damages. Id. at 760, 386 S.E.2d at 502.
325. The Supreme Court remanded Jones for reconsideration in light of its own decision
in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 2032 (1991).
326. 261 Ga. at 614, 409 S.E.2d at 503.
327. Id. at 615, 409 S.E.2d at 503. "While the Supreme Court in Haslip analyzed the
punitive damages award by comparing it to the actual award, nothing in the opinion mandates such a comparison." Id.
328. Id. "Surely the process is not rendered unconstitutional by permitting the deterrence of potentially dangerous conduct at a point in time when the injury is slight and when
only nominal damages may be involved." Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. The court observed that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g), enacted in 1987 after this occurrence, would have limited the punitive damages to $250,000. 261 Ga. at 616 n.6., 409
S.E.2d at 504 n.6.
331. 259 Ga. 78, 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989). For an expansive treatment of Self, assessing
both background and foreground, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Sue and Be Sued" in Georgia
Local Government Law: A Vignette of Vicissitudes, 41 MERCER L. REV. 13 (1989).
332. 259 Ga. at 80, 377 S.E.2d at 676. Although the language in Self appeared in a municipal charter, the court was clear that its decision extended across the board to all authorizing enactments. Id.
333. Hospital Auth. v..Litterilla, 199 Ga. App. 345, 347, 404 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1991).
334. Id. at 349, 404 S.E.2d at 800. "Accordingly, we find the equities do not demand an
exception to the general rule of retroactive application of court' decisions, and thus we will
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concluded, the hospital authority did not waive its* immunity by maintaining a "liability trust" to self-insure against its first three million dol83
lars of liability. "

•It was solely this final conclusion that attracted the supreme court's
grant of certiorari in Litterilla v. Hospital Authority.33s Elaborating upon
its practices, the court observed that the hospital maintained the "liability trust" for claims under two million dollars and purchased an "Umbrella Liability Policy" for excessive claims.3 37 Nothing in the constitution's provision for immunity waiver,3ss the court insisted, required that
the authority's "insurance program must include exclusively commercial
insurance. 8 3 39 Disagreeing with the court of appeals, therefore, the su-

preme court declared "that the Umbrella Liability Policy together with
the trust fund created by the Hospital. . . constitutes 'liability insurance
protection' within the meaning of the constitutional provision and therefore acts as a waiver of sovereign immunity."' ' 0
apply Self retroactively." Id. Judge Carley dissented on the point of retroactive application;
he was joined by Judge Pope. Id. at 352, 404 S.E.2d at 801 (Carley, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 350, 404 S.E.2d at 800 '(Carley, J., dissenting).
Since we determined. . . that the Authority is a county entity or instrumentality,
we are constrained to conclude that under Logue the Authority is not authorized
to establish a self-insurance fund, and thus the liability trust maintained by the
Authority is not a self-insurance fund and its existence does not constitute a
waiver of the Authority's governmental immunity.
Id., 404 S.E.2d at 800-01. For a later 1991 decision by the court of appeals, following its
decision in Litterilla, see Culberson v. Hospital Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 411 S.E.2d 75
(1991).
336. 262 Ga. 34, 413 S.E.2d 718 (1992). "We limit our review here to that issue." Id. at
35, 413 S.E.2d at 719.
337. Id. at 36, 413 S.E.2d at 719.
338. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
339. 262 Ga. at 36, 413 S.E.2d at 720. "To do so would inhibit any governmental entity
that elects to waive its immunity from pursuing the most cost-effective means of covering its
liability." Id.
340. Id. The supreme court's most difficult analytical challenge came in distinguishing
its decision here from that it had reached two years earlier in Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206,
392 S.E.2d 235 (1990), and upon which the court of appeals had relied here in Litterilla.In
Logue the court had held that although the county budgeted its "department of risk management" to compensate claims against: its employees, that program was devoid of statutory
authorization. Thus, the court declared the program "not a self-insurance plan which will
waive sovereign immunity." Logue, 260 Ga. at 209, 392 S.E.2d at 238. Here in Litterilla the
court said that Logue "involved a self-insurance program which provided liability insurance
to cover governmental employees-for their acts of negligence committed in the scope of their
official duties." Litterilla, 262 Ga. at 36, 413 S.E.2d at 719-20. Such programs are subject to
legislative regulation, the court said, and no program of self-insurance to cover official immunity was authorized. However, "[i]n this case, the entity that attempts to assert sovereign
immunity has, itself, purchased an Umbrella Liability Policy and provided self-insurance to
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III. LEGISLATION

Space limitations again render impossible meaningful description of
1992 statutes affecting local government. The following highly selected
sketches (all general statutes) merely hint at the range of concerns attracting legislative attention this year.
A municipality must provide the county with advance notice of proposed annexations, and, subsequently, a map of the annexed area;3' 1 annexations become effective on the last day of a calendar quarter;", certain county facilities and roads in the annexed area become municipal
responsibilities;4 8 and a municipality need wait only three years after an
area's de-annexation before considering re-annexation.34" For "60% annexations," signatures must be collected within one year; 34 5 a municipal
service plan must be submitted prior to the public hearing;34 1 and peti47
tion signatures may be withdrawn within three days after the hearing.A municipality may annex its unincorporated "island" areas of less than
'
fifty acres by passage of an ordinance,348
and is prohibited from annexing
•.
areas.
unincorporated
additional
Local government notices of emergency meetings must include anticipated subjects,350 and governing authority meetings on filling vacancies
must be open. " Open meeting and open record violations result in attorney fees to complainants only if the violative actions were without substantial justification; criminal penalties are eliminated.352 Local governments must release as public documents information on up to three
finalists in searches for management employees. 353 Public records need
not be provided for commercial solicitation purposes, and local governments may charge for the cost of disks or tapes used in supplying public
records.35"
cover its own potential liability. Under the language of the constitutional provision [Art. I, §
2, para.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351,
352.
353.
354.

9], that insurance serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity." Id., 413 S.E.2d at 720.
O.C.G.A. § 36-36-6 (Supp. 1992).
Id. § 36-36-2(a).
Id. § 36-36-7.
Id. § 36-35-2(b).
Id. § 36-36-32(g).
Id. § 36-36-35(a).
Id. § 36-36-36(c).
Id. §§ 36-36-90(3), -92(b).
Id.
Id. § 50-14-1(d) (Supp. 1992).
Id. § 50-14-3(6).
Id. § 50-14-5(b).
Id. § 50-18-72(a)(7).
Id. § 50-18-71(f).
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Local government elected officials were covered by some of the requirements of new ethics legislation, including a limitation of $1,000 per contributor on campaign contributions to persons seeking local offices.35 Additionally, the employees and board members of regional development
centers became the subjects of new standards and limitations regarding
their doing business with the centers .3
The municipal interest in redeveloping and reinvigorating former
"downtown" areas attracted legislative assistance in the form of criteria
for determining the area involved. 7 In an effort at evolving a comprehensive approach to the matter, the legislature granted municipalities various powers for effecting revival through their respective downtown development authorities. 58
Local government peace officers must now complete their basic training
courses within six months of employment.8 5 ' Additionally, local governwho are
ments are to be reimbursed for the training costs of peace officers
8 60
hired away by other agencies within a period of fifteen months.
County governing authorities are empowered to contract with in-county
municipalities to furnish municipal court services through the county
state court. 61 Municipal courts, in counties where there are no state
courts, are invested with jurisdiction over criminal trespass offenses. 62
Municipalities may contract with any county governing authority for jail
services.3
Local governments seeking extraterritorial condemnation for airport
projects must receive approval of the condemnation from the local gov8 4
ernment of the property's location.3
Local governments are prohibited from regulating the use, distribution,
transportation, disposal, or registration of pesticides.8 6 ' The government
may, however, continue to issue business licenses for the sale or application of pesticides, and may seek a variance from the above prohibitions
(from the Commissioner of Agriculture) in order to implement
stormwater management programs.8 6s

355. Id. §§ 21-5-41(a.1), -42(b), -43(b), 43.1(b) (Supp. 1992).

356. Id. § 21-5-43.
357. Id. § 36-42-3(3).

358. Id. § 36-42-4.
359. Id. § 35-8-9(a) (Supp. 1992).
360. Id. § 35-8-22(a).
361. Id. § 15-7-80 (Supp. 1992).
362. Id. § 36-32-10.1(a).
363. Id. § 15-21-94(a).
364. Id. § 6-3-22 (Supp. 1992).
365. Id. § 2-7-113.1(a) (Supp. 1992).
366. Id. § 2-7-113.1(b).
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CONCLUSION

Local government law's dynamic drive to dominance dramatically
dwarfed by contrast the dissipating descent toward disaster documented
for some domains this year. The natural temptation to savor the moment
must be tempered by the resounding realization of the inevitable: Of the
analytical discipline to which much is justifiably accorded, much is likewise expected. Next year's survey will undoubtedly record the results of
those expectations.

